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Thank you very much for your consideration of the following article. The piece discusses 
the long-established shared privacy interest in conversations in American society, from 
the country’s infancy up to the present day. Its core argument is as follows: (1) the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment should apply more broadly throughout remote 
conversations; (2) the extent of the protection should not depend on the means of the 
conversation’s transmission, i.e. land line telephone, cellular telephone, instant message, 
text message, e-mail correspondence, FAX, etc.; (3) since there is a reasonable 
expectation of shared privacy in certain conversations, extending the coverage of the 
Fourth Amendment to conversations will bring search and seizure jurisprudence more in 
line with common customs, and would be more an affirmation of American society’s 
general and rightful expectations than unfounded judicial policymaking. 
 
Christopher M. Drake 
J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, June 2007 
 
Conversational Standing: A New Approach to an Old Privacy Problem 
 
Despite the increasing complexity, accessibility,1 and importance of communication 
technologies,2 many characteristics of today’s communication mirror those existing in the early 
days of the United States Constitution.3 One of the most notable is the shared expectation of 
privacy in a conversation. In the remote communication context, despite differences between the 
various remote media in common use, it is the conversation4 in which people expect privacy and 
in which such expectations are often objectively reasonable. Courts have nevertheless used a 
range of criteria to evaluate the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, including means, 
place, time, content, and more. In most cases, including those the judiciary has not yet 
considered, this approach is likely to be both misguided and unnecessary. 
 
Remote communication is a clear example of an institution5 whose core precepts have not 
changed.6 The Supreme Court has already acknowledged as much.7 For instance, remote 
 
1 See Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1572-76 (2004) (detailing the increasingly widespread 
use of the Internet in the United States). 
2 See Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-
Wide Search 105 YALE L.J. 1093, 1109 (1996) (describing an increasing reliance on computers and computer-based 
communication technology); Katopis, “Searching” Cyberspace: The Fourth Amendment and Electronic Mail, 14 
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 175, 177-78 (similar observation). 
3 Even so, some commentators have argued that interpretations of the Fourth Amendment should not be so rooted in 
expectations of the past and their applicability to modern-day fact patterns. See, e.g., Henderson, Nothing New 
Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 563 
(2005) (arguing that “the command of the Fourth Amendment is better served by adapting to changing 
circumstances than tenaciously hanging onto the past”). 
4 Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary defines “conversation” as an “oral exchange of sentiments, observations, 
opinions, or ideas,” at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/conversation. Here and throughout, for purposes of the 
argument, this definition of conversation will extend to any similar exchange, whether written or oral, in which at 
least two people are exchanging sentiments, observations, opinions, ideas, or other information. 
5 See Mulligan, supra note 1, at 1586 (“The change in form [between e-mail and 18th Century letters] should not 
override the shared nature of paper correspondence and electronic correspondence”). 
6 Postal correspondence is, at least arguably, exactly one form of interaction the Fourth Amendment sought to 
protect. For analysis of the similarities between letters of the late 18th Century and e-mails of today, see Guirguis, 
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communication is the core purpose of personal letters, sometimes even involving interaction by 
way of back-and-forth letter writing. The Framers of the Bill of Rights would almost certainly 
have recognized privacy in letters due to their conversational nature. In the broader context, there 
is no meaningful difference between a letter and a facsimile or e-mail, 8 between cordless, land-
based, and cellular telephone conversations,9 or between a text message on a cellular phone and 
an instant message on a computer. All of these different communication tools share the same 
foundation: remote interaction with specific parties.10 If the parties have taken reasonable steps 
to make their interactions private, then a presumption of objectively reasonable privacy 
expectations should prevail.11 
The Constitution’s Fourth Amendment12 has long served as the anchoring constitutional privacy 
provision, recognizing certain spheres of life that the government may only infiltrate with good, 
sanctioned reason. The jurisprudence construing the Fourth Amendment is by now extensively 
developed. However, the change in communication capabilities has been so rapid that the 
judiciary has not been able to interpret the resulting privacy concerns consistently.13 The key 
difficulty with the emerging jurisprudence has been a seeming arbitrariness, lack of clarity, or 
approach that is otherwise out of touch with common practice.14 One example is the greater 
judicial protection for telephone calls made through land-based connections than for calls made 
 
Electronic Mail Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 135 (2003). See also 
id. at 155 (noting that “an overly broad warrant authorizing the police to monitor all sent and received e-mails 
repulses the Fourth Amendment as much as the general writs of colonial America the Framers expressly sought to 
ban”).   
7 For instance, the Supreme Court has repeatedly established that letters and packages qualify as “effects” receiving 
constitutional protection. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other sealed 
packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; 
warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasonable”). 
8 Though courts and commentators have made numerous analogies between these forms of communication and 
others that do not carry particularly strong privacy protections. One such example is the comparison between an e-
mail message and a postcard, where the postcard does not receive the same privacy recognition as a postal letter 
because it is not in a sealed container. See Note, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1591, 1597 (1997) (describing analogies 
between postal mail and communications in cyberspace). 
9 See id. 
10 Of course, many of them also have the same physical infrastructure. See Guirguis, supra note 6, at 136 (noting 
that many of the most common modern communication devices are “essentially based on the telephone and make 
use of the same underground cables, digital lines, radios, and satellite links to make connections between two or 
more users”) 
11 See Reetz, Note, Warrant Requirement for Searches of Computerized Information, 67 B.U. L. REV. 179, 197 
(1987) (arguing that “[a]n individual's expectation of privacy in computer records should be considered legitimate 
when, under similar circumstances, the person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records of another 
form”). 
12 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated..." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
13 See, e.g., Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV.
1181, 1228 (arguing that “[t]he information stored on a computer is the same as that which could be stored in filing 
cabinets or desks, and should receive the same protection). 
14 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(d) (4th ed. 
2004), citing Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 827 (1999) (noting that “[the Court] (1) ‘has 
interpreted privacy to be a question of fact rather than a constitutional value’ and (2) is apparently ‘out of touch with 
society’s true expectations of privacy.’”) 
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using cellular15 or cordless phones.16 That discrepancy demonstrates an errant focus not on the 
communication via telephone, but instead on the means of transmission. Similarly, while the 
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment protects the contents of letters and sealed 
packages,17 lower courts have been inconsistent in their willingness to extend Fourth 
Amendment protection to e-mail. For instance, e-mails and records of conversations on computer 
hard drives generally receive greater protection when sent from personal computers at home18 
rather than from computers at one’s place of work.19 In using the reasonable privacy inquiry, the 
courts are using more factors as the complexity of the communication technology increases.20 
The factors determine not only whether certain communications are protected in the first place, 
but also the amount of protection they receive.21 Courts will only make their task more 
cumbersome by adding greater detail to the inquiry,22 both for members of the bar and for 
members of society in understanding whether their privacy expectations are constitutionally 
reasonable. Because the expectation of conversational privacy is as old as the country itself, the 
best way to validate its legitimacy is constitutional acknowledgment, namely its recognition in 
the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.23 
Fourth Amendment protection is limited to those who have “standing” to assert it. Generally 
speaking, a claimant must establish that his or her own Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
 
15 Though there is some support for the notion that courts will find an explicit expectation of privacy in cellular 
phone communications. See Guirguis, supra note 6, at 139-40 (describing interpretations of the Third, Fifth, and 
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals that might suggest Fourth Amendment protection for cellular phone 
conversations). 
16 Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1148 (2001) (no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a cordless 
conversation “readily susceptible to interception,” nor did the Federal Wiretap Act cover the conversation, since 
cordless conversations were not protected until 1994); United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 181 (5th Cir. 1992) (as 
a matter of law, no Title III or Fourth Amendment violation to intercept cordless telephone calls, even if the speaker 
had a subjective expectation of privacy); McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1239-40 (“No reported decision has 
concluded that a cordless telephone user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cordless phone conversations 
under [the] Fourth Amendment”) 
17 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
18 Though Professor Kerr argues for computers being analogized to “homes and sealed containers[:] Just as an 
individual generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home and his packages, so too should he have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his personal hard drive.” Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a 
Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 549 (2005). 
19 United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 836-37 (D. Neb. 2003) (no standing in files on a work computer). 
But see Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (finding Fourth Amendment standing to exclude contents of 
office files of which Defendant had custody, although the files were taken from a space Defendant shared with other 
employees). 
20 See Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 875-76 (2004) (noting judicial struggles to digest fact patterns involving developing 
technologies and a resulting greater likelihood of judicial errors). 
21 See, e.g., Simon, The Tangled Web We Weave: The Internet and Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 21 
NOVA L. REV. 941, 968 (1997) (concluding that, in the context of e-mail sent over a network, “it would seem that 
encryption of data is the only way a user can attain a legitimate expectation of privacy for purposes of standing 
under the Fourth Amendment”). 
22 Though some say the judiciary should not be as involved in such policy definitions. For the argument that 
determining reasonable expectations of privacy in light of technological advancements is more appropriate for 
legislatures, not courts, see generally Kerr, supra note 20. 
23 See Katopis, supra note 2, at 205 (arguing that “Constitutional case law [and] statutory bases to protect all the 
components of e-mail from government searches [must] be broadly construed”). 
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in order to have standing to challenge a violation.24 From the beginnings of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, standing often depended on possession of, or some other property interest in, the 
challenged item or place.25 Since the 1967 Katz decision,26 however, standing generally has 
turned on whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the challenged item or 
place.27 Justice Harlan, concurring in that decision, laid out the familiar two-part test for this 
expectation of privacy: first, the defendant must have demonstrated “an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy;” second, that “expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”28 Society has long recognized the shared privacy interest in certain 
conversations, applying equally to all participants.29 Therefore, the judiciary should affirm that 
parties to those conversations have standing to challenge unreasonable government intrusion on 
the conversation.30 Moreover, in adjusting Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the increasing 
number of remote communication technologies, the “standing” inquiry should focus solely on 
the conversation itself and should not depend on the means of transmission.31 
In practice, conversational standing would constitutionally prevent the intrusion of the 
government, or its agents, on private communications, unless any of three exceptions applied. 
First, a properly issued and executed warrant authorizing interception of a conversation would 
 
24 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
25 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (“To establish ‘standing,’ Courts of Appeals have 
generally required that the movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a 
substantial possessory interest in the premises searched”) 
26 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
27 Professor Kerr contends that the shift in judicial inquiry has not been as significant as it might first appear. See 
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 801, 807 (2004) (“The Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test has proven more a revolution on paper 
than in practice; Katz has had a surprisingly limited effect on the largely property-based contours of traditional 
Fourth Amendment law”). 
28 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
29 Following up on the principle announced in Katz, the Supreme Court suggested that both parties to a telephone 
conversation have standing to object to a warrantless wiretap of the phone line, but only if law enforcement is 
violating a clearly protected constitutional right, such as presence in one’s own home. See Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and lower courts have yet to clearly establish, or 
even address, privacy protections for recorded conversations after they reach their recipients, or for conversations 
transmitted by means other than grounded telephone lines. For instance, the sender of a postal letter loses her 
expectation of privacy in the letter’s contents upon delivery. United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir. 1995). 
The Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against other parties to a conversation 
informing the police of wrongdoing. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745 (1971). However, it has not indicated whether the sender retains standing in the conversation if the police obtain 
a copy of it without a proper warrant and after the recipient has already seen it, as with an opened letter found in a 
search of the recipient’s house. See United States v. Dunning, 312 F.3d 528, 531-32 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
sender had neither a legitimate expectation of privacy in the letter to his girlfriend once it was delivered nor a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s home). 
30 Commentators have suggested that just such a principle underlies Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally. See 
Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 297 (2005) (“Fourth Amendment 
rules traditionally focus on the justification for entry into a space, not whether the item to be seized after the space is 
entered should be deemed public or private”). In this sense, the actual content of whatever conversation the 
government wants to access is immaterial. Rather, it is the government’s act of intrusion on the conversation itself, 
regardless of content, that is the “entry into a space” and that courts might consider a constitutional infraction. 
31 See Katopis, supra note 2, at 199 (arguing that “[c]ontent is precisely what the Fourth Amendment strives to 
protect”). 
Christopher Drake, “Conversational Standing: A New Approach to an Old Privacy Problem” 
15 Everett Street #48, Cambridge, MA 02138 * Tel. (415) 205-9697 * cdrake@law.harvard.edu 
 
- 5 -
make that intrusion, and any information obtained from it, constitutionally reasonable.32 Second, 
the government could defeat claims of conversational standing if exigent circumstances required 
the intrusion.33 An example would be the imminent destruction of evidence in light of probable 
cause and not enough time to secure a warrant.34 Finally, if any party to the conversation invited 
the government’s participation,35 then the government would become an equal participant in the 
conversation, and the original parties would have no standing to challenge the government’s 
participation.36 In other words, any invited participant in the conversation, meaning one at whom 
anyone already participating directed any communication pursuant to the conversation, could 
either inform the government of the conversation’s content or allow the government to “listen in” 
without infringing any other party’s rights. The rule would apply even without the knowledge or 
consent of any other party,37 just as anyone can disclose any part of a conversation to a third 
party without the knowledge of any other direct participant38 and without violating the Fourth 
Amendment. Generally speaking, the concept calls for protection from uninvited government 
intrusion on a conversation — that is, participation without any invited party’s knowledge or 
consent.39 The goal would be to protect conversational privacy from government intrusion only 
as much as we protect it in our ordinary social relations. That protection is precisely what 
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine targets,40 so the recognition of conversational 
 
32 Such a condition would not always invalidate standing, however. The party or parties could argue that the warrant 
did not properly issue, substantively or procedurally, and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
should not apply. If the challenge were successful, the court would then retroactively invalidate the warrant and 
could grant conversational standing unless it found either of the other two exceptions applicable. 
33 See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984). 
34 The government would still have the burden of proving that it had probable cause to make the intrusion, that it 
reasonably believed that the evidence sought was on the brink of destruction, and that it could not have obtained the 
evidence but for the warrantless intrusion 
35 Settled doctrine holds that one who sends or otherwise offers up a communication does not have a constitutional 
right to stop the recipient from turning that communication over to the government. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 
427 (1963); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); United States 
v. King, 55 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Oh. 1997); United States v. Jones, 364 F.Supp.2d 1303 (D. Utah 2005). See 
also Adler, supra note 2, at 1111 (noting that the risk of third parties disclosing information willingly revealed “in 
public or [to] others” is a “natural part of human interaction”). 
36 Justice O’Connor, concurring in part and in the judgment in United States v. Karo, illustrated this principle nicely 
by analogizing a conversation to a jointly controlled container: “[T]wo people who speak face to face in a private 
place or on a private telephone line both may share an expectation that the conversation will remain private, but 
either may give effective consent to a wiretap or other electronic surveillance. One might say that the telephone line, 
or simply the space that separates two persons in conversation, is their jointly owned ‘container.’ Each has standing 
to challenge the use as evidence of the fruits of an unauthorized search of that ‘container,’ but either may also give 
effective consent to the search.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 726 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(internal citations omitted). 
37 To reiterate: in most conversations, no one participant has direct control over whom any other participant invites 
to join the conversation, nor over what that participant chooses to disclose. Exceptions include conversations held 
under contractual agreements of confidentiality, in which case aggrieved parties’ claims of standing would most 
likely survive. 
38 This kind of behavior is better known as “gossip,” which happens often despite its negative connotation. 
39 “Knowledge and consent” subsumes the Fourth Amendment’s provisions allowing governmental intrusion in 
certain instances. In other words, if the government has a warrant and/or probable cause, then it is assumed to be 
acting with the knowledge and/or consent of the parties. 
40 The Supreme Court has itself acknowledged the need to align judicial standards with societal expectations, 
particularly when Fourth Amendment privacy rights are at stake: a reasonable expectation of privacy must have “a 
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
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standing would be not only a small departure from the established jurisprudence, but also a major 
step in favor of societal expectations. 
 
While the first prong of the Katz test is less doctrinally puzzling because it is heavily fact-based, 
the second prong presents the greatest challenge to the judiciary because its legal interpretation 
now determines when a claimant has standing.41 This prong is at the center of this Article’s 
discussion because it calls for a close look at society’s attitudes about privacy. Its language 
suggests that the judiciary should consider both societal attitudes that have changed with the 
growth of communication and those that have remained constant. The more simply courts apply 
the Katz standard, the more effective, consistent, and trustworthy their conclusions will be,42 and 
the more they will avoid a clash with societal beliefs about privacy.43 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the history of Fourth Amendment standing 
and describes the doctrine’s evolution into its present form. Part II explains the importance of 
recognizing standing throughout a conversation, equally applicable to all of the conversation’s 
participants, as well as the limits and implications of conversational standing. Part III concludes 
with a discussion of modern-day interpretations of shared privacy interests and how they might 
apply to the concept of conversational standing as described throughout. 
 
I. History & Overview of Fourth Amendment Standing 
 
The Fourth Amendment traditionally only protects property — and now, in a broader sense, 
privacy — under specific circumstances. The one constant underlying all Fourth Amendment 
requirements is that anyone claiming the protection of the Fourth Amendment must have 
standing to assert it. The most significant characteristic of Fourth Amendment standing doctrine 
is that “Fourth Amendment rights … may not be vicariously asserted.”44 That is, parties only 
have standing to assert their own clearly defined constitutional rights, not those of others, even 
those constitutional rights in which they might have some legitimate stake.45 This same principle 
holds for constitutional violations: in order to have Fourth Amendment standing, parties must 
show that the constitutional violations were directed against them,46 such as police invasion of 
the violated party’s home (but not that of a good friend or a neighbor), or wiretapping of the 
 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998), citing 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 & n.12. 
41 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (“a ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by definition means more than a 
subjective expectation of not being discovered”); see also id. at 148 (petitioners’ claim failed because they “made no 
showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy…”). 
42 See Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century 
Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303 (2002) (arguing that the Katz test should be applied with only the results of 
the challenged intrusion in mind, not the method of intrusion). 
43 See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 1, at 1592 (“Individuals consider their e-mail private, and the Court has 
consistently reiterated the importance of protecting the privacy of private communications”). 
44 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174. 
45 For a broad overview of the evolution of standing doctrine and its effect on enforcement of the exclusionary rule, 
see Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 2466 (1996). 
46 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72; United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 81-82 (1993). See also United States v. 
Williams, 580 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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violated party’s personal phone line (but not that of a family member).47 Likewise, parties may 
only challenge the admission of tainted evidence48 against them in legal proceedings, not 
evidence that is admitted against another party but nonetheless implicates the would-be-
contesting parties.49 Judicial interpretation is critical because the concept is circular: standing is 
required to challenge constitutional violations, but a judicially-determined, constitutional stake in 
the violations is necessary to establish standing. The jurisprudence that has developed since 
Katz50 and Rakas v. Illinois51 has produced a much more compact doctrinal inquiry: Fourth 
Amendment protection only applies when the government has invaded the claimant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.52 
In order to enforce the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court 
adopted the now well-known exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure.53 The rule’s 
development took place almost entirely during the 20th Century. It began with the case of Weeks 
v. United States,54 which held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was 
inadmissible in federal criminal trials.55 The Court only extended the exclusionary rule to state 
criminal investigations many years later, in the 1964 case Mapp v. Ohio.56 Throughout much of 
the 20th Century, an aggrieved party only had standing to challenge admission of certain 
evidence if the item at issue belonged to her, or if she otherwise had property rights in the 
invaded item or space rising to the level of constitutional protection.57 The exclusionary rule 
became both a powerful tool for deterring government abuse in criminal investigations and a 
powerful means for defendants to retroactively suppress evidence against them. Nevertheless, its 
effectiveness in deterring law enforcement or protecting defendants depends almost exclusively 
on who has standing to assert the rule. 
 
The 1967 Katz58 decision solidified the role of the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
evaluations of standing. In Katz, the government taped a microphone to a telephone booth from 
which Charles Katz, suspected of involvement in an illegal wagering scheme, was known to 
 
47 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 725-26 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] third person, who never used a particular 
telephone line, could not suppress, at least on Fourth Amendment grounds, evidence obtained by an unlawful 
wiretap of conversations between two other persons”). 
48 Evidence obtained pursuant to a Fourth Amendment violation. 
49 See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 179 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). 
50 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
51 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
52 See id. at 140. 
53 It is still worth noting that violations of the Fourth Amendment are generally only cognizable when the 
government commits them. Thus, the exclusionary rule does not apply when the government is not responsible for a 
privacy invasion that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 
(1921) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s] origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the 
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies”) 
54 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
55 Id. at 398. 
56 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
57 See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See also United States v. 
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951) (holding that defendant had standing in narcotics seized from a hotel room to 
which his aunts had given him a key). 
58 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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make regular phone calls.59 The government recorded Katz’s conversations in the booth, 
effectively eavesdropping on his phone calls without wiretapping the phone line. The evidence 
was admitted against Katz and used to convict him. The Supreme Court overturned the 
conviction,60 holding that the Fourth Amendment protected Katz’s privacy in the phone booth 
from the government surveillance.61 Two often-quoted dicta from the opinions in Katz are 
arguably most responsible for the shift in standing doctrine. The first is Justice Potter Stewart’s 
assertion in the majority opinion that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”62 
suggesting that the Court would look more closely at a broader set of personal concerns rather 
than confining itself to property or possessory interests.63 The second assertion, from Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion, has become the linchpin of Fourth Amendment privacy 
determinations. Justice Harlan focused solely on a person’s privacy interests in a place or thing. 
He suggested two factors to determine a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth 
Amendment purposes: first, whether the person “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy” in the place or thing; second, whether “the expectation [is] one that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable.”64 As courts have seized on Justice Harlan’s language since Katz,
defendants now have Fourth Amendment privacy if they demonstrate both subjective and 
objective expectations of privacy in challenged evidence. 
 
Despite the impact of Katz, property and possessory interests remain key to Fourth Amendment 
standing inquiries.65 The Supreme Court quickly reaffirmed that principle, holding in the 1973 
Brown decision that there is no Fourth Amendment standing to suppress evidence seized from a 
place in which the challengers lack possessory or property interests.66 In that case, defendants 
successfully conspired to steal merchandise from a warehouse.67 They stored the stolen items at a 
co-conspirator’s store.68 The government invaded the store and seized the stolen goods, using 
them as evidence to convict defendants despite a violation of the co-conspirator’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.69 Defendants challenged the admission of the evidence, but the Supreme 
Court held that they did not have standing because they were not on the premises when the 
government seized the evidence and, most importantly, because they had no possessory or 
property interest in their co-conspirator’s store. 70 The opinion did not explicitly address 
defendants’ privacy interests, presumably finding them either irrelevant or overridden by their 
 
59 Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
60 Id. at 359. 
61 Id. at 353. 
62 Id. at 351. 
63 The opinion also quotes language from Warden v. Hayden declaring that “[t]he premise that property interests 
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, citing Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). 
64 Id. at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65 See Simmons, supra note 42, at 1314. 
66 Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973) (holding that defendants did not have standing because they 
“were not on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure, alleged no proprietary or possessory 
interest in the premises, and were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element of the offense 
charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure”). 
67 Id. at 224-25. 
68 Id. at 225. 
69 Id. at 225-26. 
70 Id. at 229. 
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lack of proprietary interests in the store. It served as one clear example that the Court would not 
limit its evaluations of standing to the Katz privacy framework. 
 
The Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Rakas v. Illinois71 has become the leading case on Fourth 
Amendment standing over the past two decades. In Rakas, police stopped defendants, suspected 
of robbing a clothing store, as they escaped in a car.72 Upon searching the car, the police found 
ammunition in the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat,73 
which were admitted into evidence against defendants and used to convict them. Defendants 
argued that the search of the car in which they were traveling, and the seizure of the weapons 
found inside the car, violated their constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held 
that they did not have standing to suppress the guns and ammunition as evidence because they 
neither owned nor had any recognized property interests in the car.74 Such a property or 
possessory interest would certainly have existed if any of the defendants had owned the car, and 
would probably have existed if defendants had been allowed to borrow the car indefinitely. 
However, since the defendants did not have those interests, they did not have standing and their 
convictions were upheld. 
 
Shortly after the Court decided Rakas, a government loophole to violate the Fourth Amendment 
in obtaining evidence entered the doctrinal scheme. United States v. Payner75 involved a man 
indicted for falsifying his tax returns.76 The evidence used to indict him was recovered through a 
private investigator’s plan, designed to access bank records from a Bahamian bank that would 
demonstrate Payner’s guilt.77 In order to get the bank records, however, the investigator arranged 
a plan to steal a briefcase belonging to the bank’s vice president, knowing that the briefcase 
contained the condemning evidence.78 The Court held that Payner did not have standing to 
suppress the evidence seized from the bank’s vice-president, both because he did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank records79 and, implicitly, because he did not own 
the stolen briefcase.80 In other words, since Payner and the bank vice-president did not share a 
privacy interest in either the briefcase or the records, Payner had suffered no constitutional 
 
71 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
72 Id. at 130. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 143, 149-50 & n.17. 
75 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
76 Id. at 728. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 732, citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that a bank customer had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in checks, deposit slips, and other records of his banking activity). 
80 447 U.S. at 733-34. The Court acknowledged “the District Court’s commendable desire to deter deliberate 
intrusions into the privacy of persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal prosecution,” in this case 
the bank vice-president, and opined that “[n]o court should condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal 
behavior of those who planned and executed this ‘briefcase caper.’” Nevertheless, it justified lack of standing on a 
balancing test, weighing the value of excluding evidence “against the considerable harm that would flow from 
indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule,” concluding that the court should not have exercised such 
discretion in barring the evidence against Payner. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), presents virtually the 
same justification, although its holding would have denied standing based on privacy in another person’s effects. 
Thus, according to a Rawlings analysis, even if Payner had retained an expectation of privacy in his bank records, he 
would have lacked an expectation of privacy in the vice-president’s briefcase and thus could not challenge the 
admission of the records as evidence. 
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violation. The judgment came over a lengthy and vigorous dissent by Justice Marshall, who 
crisply summed up the dangers inherent in the majority’s interpretation: “[The] holding 
effectively turns the standing rules created by this Court for assertions of Fourth Amendment 
violations into a sword to be used by the Government to permit it deliberately to invade one 
person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against another person.”81 Under 
Payner, despite serious concerns that even the majority itself acknowledged, almost any 
evidence against a third party is fair game for government seizure if the third party has no 
individual or shared privacy interest in the evidence or in the location of the evidence.82 
Rakas indicated that privacy depends heavily on context. Defendants might have subjectively 
expected privacy from the government in the car, but the holding indicates that such an 
expectation was not objectively reasonable at the time. One common example of this subjective-
objective conflict is government surveillance of workplace computers. Regardless of the 
likelihood of employer monitoring, any posted disclaimer removes any expectation of privacy 
the employee has in her actions on a workplace computer.83 Strongly implied disclaimers, such 
as on computers that the employee knows others will be using, also defeat the privacy 
expectation.84 However, if employees have control and authority over a space or items in a 
common workplace environment, they may have standing to challenge government intrusion on 
the space or items, based primarily on their possessory interest.85 Overall, the privacy and 
proprietary interests have become intertwined. Although each is significant in determining a 
defendant’s standing, the one generally implies the other, at least in some measure.86 
Conversational privacy depends on the validation of shared privacy interests, but the judiciary’s 
shared privacy recognition is murky even beyond the conversational context. For example, in 
Minnesota v. Olson,87 defendant had standing because he was a designated overnight guest in an 
apartment and thus had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings kept 
there during his stay.88 However, in the more recent Minnesota v. Carter decision,89 defendants 
did not have standing as invited guests in an apartment because they were there only for a limited 
time and were there for a business purpose, albeit an illicit one.90 Since their presence was only 
transitory and for such a narrow purpose, they had no objectively reasonable expectation of 
 
81 Id. at 738 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
82 See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06 (holding that defendant lacked standing to challenge seizure of controlled 
substances from an acquiantance’s purse because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the purse). 
83 See United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that a university professor had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy on workplace computer with clear disclaimers warning against misuse). See also 
Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 831; United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000); Monroe v. United 
States, 52 M.J. 326, 328, 330 (Court for the Armed Forces 2000). 
84 See United States v. Butler, 151 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D. Me. 2001) (holding that there is no “generic expectation of 
privacy” on computers in a university computer lab). 
85 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); DeForte, 392 U.S. at 369; Levanthal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 
(2d Cir. 2001) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in an office computer not shared with other employees). 
86 See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 95; Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in items 
seized from a purse not belonging to defendant); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1990) (finding a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as an overnight houseguest); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (finding 
no reasonable expectation of privacy as temporary houseguests for business purposes). 
87 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
88 Id. at 100. 
89 525 U.S. 83 (1998). 
90 Id. at 91. 
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privacy from government intrusion, and their convictions were upheld.91 The two cases set up an 
ambiguity in shared privacy interests:92 Olson and the apartment owner had a shared privacy 
interest that the government unreasonably invaded, but the Carter defendants did not. Even in 
these situations, which could have been nearly identical more than 200 years ago, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that there are a number of varying factors to consider in determining shared 
privacy interests and relevant Fourth Amendment standing.93 Not only will the multiplicity of 
factors make the judiciary’s work much tougher, but it could also lead to ad hoc determinations 
of standing. 
 
The combination of Payner, Rakas, Olson, and Carter gives at least some guidance as to which 
shared privacy interests the Supreme Court will now recognize. First, Payner and Rakas 
establish that claimants can only assert their own rights and not those of others — that is, they 
cannot argue that someone else’s privacy was constitutionally violated and claim the same 
privacy right for themselves. On the other hand, Olson and Carter demonstrate that guests often 
do have shared privacy rights and, consequently, have Fourth Amendment standing in their 
capacity as guests. While Carter indicates that the right depends on the context of the visit,94 the 
majority still acknowledged that guests often qualify for Fourth Amendment standing.95 Property 
concerns were critical to the determination of privacy interests in all four cases, involving 
ownership itself or the rights implicated by granting access to certain property. The principle 
emerging from the cases appears to be that “legitimate” guests have constitutionally protected 
privacy interests in certain tangible property, including a home, a vehicle, or other effects. 
However, the applicability of this principle to intangible evidence remains to be seen. 
 
The inquiry in cases of intangible evidence, and Fourth Amendment standing to suppress that 
evidence and its fruits, still focuses almost exclusively on the reasonable expectation of privacy. 
One of the most common examples of the judiciary’s intangible privacy examination is the 
Internet chat room. Many of the criminal interactions on Internet chat sites involve child 
pornography. Generally, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in public Internet chat 
 
91 Professor Weinreb was less than pleased with this outcome. See Weinreb, Your Place or Mine? Privacy of 
Presence Under the Fourth Amendment, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 256 (1999) (“[T]he decision in Carter is possibly 
the most clearly mistaken and the underlying jurisprudence the most inadequate of all the cases decided under the 
Fourth Amendment in the past thirty years”). 
92 The disconnect between these two cases creates an even larger set of plausible inconsistencies. For example, if the 
defendant in Olson had been an overnight guest on a business trip, would he have had standing? What if he had not 
been a friend of the apartment’s owner or tenant? If he had not initially planned to spend the night but were then 
invited to stay? Similarly, if the defendants in Carter had intended to spend the night after completing their illicit 
business, would they have had standing to object? What if the business were not facially illegal but were instead part 
of a larger conspiracy? And what if the case had been decided on different grounds, such as the defeat of defendants’ 
privacy interests with the apartment’s blinds left open wide enough for a police officer to see inside? Any of these 
hypothetical situations could easily take place, just as any of them could have been part of circumstances that the 
police could not have understood ex ante. 
93 See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); United States 
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1973). 
94 Carter, 525 U.S. at 90 (“[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but 
one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not”). 
95 See id. at 89 (“[W]e have held that in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the house of someone else”). 
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rooms, including from undercover government agents who participate.96 Defendants who expose 
criminal activity in these chat rooms essentially run the risk that anyone will participate, placing 
the government on equal footing with any other participant and therefore making the surveillance 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Even if defendants are not participating in public chat 
room conversations, instead maintaining written or otherwise recorded communications with one 
or a few people, the Fourth Amendment does not protect defendants from having the contents of 
the conversation disclosed to the government.97 Further, if the government secretly participates 
while assuming a different identity, the contents of the conversation are still admissible and the 
Fourth Amendment does not shield them.98 
Protection strengthens only if a tangible implement is involved. Thus, in United States v. 
Carnes,99 defendant had standing to challenge admission of six audio tapes with recorded 
conversations between himself and his girlfriend.100 The physical evidence containing the 
intangible evidence belonged to him and was found in his girlfriend’s home, and he was found to 
have a possessory (and, by extension, privacy) interest in the seized tapes even though they were 
illegally made and he did not lawfully “own” them.101 The case demonstrates that although 
privacy is the dominant inquiry, the evaluation has become so multi-faceted that it risks 
becoming even more cumbersome and nuanced as technological progress continues. Any clarity 
in the governing standards could soon become baffling, making the judiciary’s job even more 
difficult. 
 
Fortunately, there is a pre-emptive solution to the possible confusion on Fourth Amendment 
privacy concerns. Participants reasonably expect certain conversations to remain private. Even 
though the judiciary has not explicitly addressed Fourth Amendment standing in conversations 
per se, recognizing inherent privacy in conversations is a plausible approach. Moreover, 
adopting the concept of conversational standing would not only make future evaluations easier 
for the courts, but would also better align the jurisprudence with societal expectations of privacy. 
The following section describes how conversational standing would operate, how courts might 
apply it uniformly in cases invoking conversational privacy, and why it is particularly important 
to recognize conversational standing in today’s increasingly complex communication landscape. 
 
II. Conversational Standing 
 
A. The Shared Privacy of Conversations 
 
96 See, e.g., Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177; State v. Evers, 815 A.2d 432 (N.J. 2003); State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 
255 (Wash. 2002); Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823 (Penn. 2001); State v. Lott, 879 A.2d 1167 (N.H. 
2005). 
97 King, 55 F.3d 1193; United States v. Mavroules, 813 F.Supp. 115 (D. Mass. 1993). 
98 Townsend, 57 P.3d 255; Lott, 879 A.2d 1167. 
99 309 F.3d 950 (6th Cir. 2002). 
100 Id. at 959. 
101 Id. at 960. However, Carnes did not have standing to suppress a seventh tape, which was found in a tape recorder 
underneath his girlfriend’s trailer home. The Court’s reasoning conflicts somewhat with its rationale for Carnes’s 
standing in the six other tapes seized: “Carnes never lived [in the trailer] and certainly was not present in it or in 
possession of the recorder or the tape when [his girlfriend] turned them over to the police. It would be unreasonable 
for him to claim an expectation of privacy with respect to something that he had no control or dominion over.” Id.
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The law currently grants Fourth Amendment standing to the party serving as the conduit for the 
government interception, such as the one whose telephone line is tapped or whose e-mail files 
are seized in transmission. Functionally speaking, the law officially recognizes only individual 
privacy interests in conversations, not shared privacy interests. Thus, in a private telephone 
conversation between two people, both in their homes, only the party whose phone the 
government wiretapped would have standing to challenge admission of any evidence based on 
the conversation.102 The inquiry itself turns primarily on the invasion of the homeowner’s 
explicit Fourth Amendment rights by tapping the telephone line.103 This loophole opens the door 
for abusive government eavesdropping — not that this will actually take place,104 but it certainly 
could.105 When a commonly private conversation takes place, all parties to the conversation can 
reasonably expect that it will be free from governmental intrusion most of the time.106 
Particularly within the present array of remote communication possibilities, it is more important 
than ever to recognize the principle, implied in the Constitution, that certain conversations are 
presumptively private. 
 
The judiciary’s focus on fine technological distinctions and associated property rights has 
detracted from what should be its core focus: the nature of the relevant privacy interests. When it 
comes to conversations, privacy should not depend on technology. Without explicit statements to 
the contrary, such as disclaimers on computer screens or recorded disclaimers before phone calls 
begin, parties generally expect their remote communications to be free from warrantless 
government intrusion. Some parties might demonstrate a greater subjective expectation of 
privacy in the same conversation. For instance, someone walking down the street talking on a 
cellular phone does not demonstrate the same privacy expectation as someone on the other end 
of the call but alone in a soundproof room.107 Regardless of the degree of privacy interests either 
subjectively demonstrated or objectively reasonable, one presumption remains clear: the parties 
to the remote conversation share a privacy interest in the conversation’s contents.108 
102 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 176. 
103 See id. at 179-80. 
104 Although it is arguably taking place right now, with the National Security Agency’s eavesdropping on domestic – 
international phone calls without warrants. 
105 The loophole gained explicit recognition in Payner, where the Court held that evidence the government 
concededly obtained in violation of the Constitution was admissible against a third party, since his constitutional 
rights were not violated. In essence, the Court cut back slightly on its post-Katz inquiry in Fourth Amendment cases, 
appearing to base the constitutional violation on interference with a possessory interest (one man’s briefcase was 
stolen, and evidence obtained from it was used against a third party) and not on a third party’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
106 This does not mean that the conversation would be entirely immune from government participation. For instance, 
one participant could willingly turn over incriminating information from the conversation to the government. It only 
means that participants in private conversations reasonably believe that the government is not secretly listening. 
107 However, even though the one talking on the cell phone in public runs the risk that passers-by, even government 
agents, will overhear her, she can still expect to be free from the government intercepting her cell phone’s 
transmission just as much as the speaker in the soundproof room can expect privacy. 
108 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area is somewhat murky. In Padilla, the Court held in a per curiam 
opinion that co-conspirators do not automatically have standing to challenge government intrusion on jointly used 
property or a scheme in which they all play a significant role. Padilla, 508 U.S. at 82. But see United States v. 
Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that six defendants, all involved in marijuana cultivation, 
had standing to challenge the government’s aerial search of the greenhouse where the marijuana was growing 
because “[p]articipation in an arrangement that indicates joint control and supervision of the place searched 
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Katz helped to establish the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, but it is now only helpful 
insofar as its formulation applies to shared privacy interests. Katz himself had standing to object 
to admission of his recorded conversations as evidence against him. However, those on the other 
end of the line did not, and the eavesdropping on Katz eviscerated any privacy interests they 
might have had. While the limited protection could deter incriminating statements in any kind of 
remote communication, its potential chilling effect on speech calls for judicial reevaluation. 
Unlike in Katz, there are now multiple remote communication methods in common use. The 
judiciary must avoid differentiating between the different methods, always beginning with a 
presumption of shared conversational privacy.109 Doing so would not offend Katz. The only 
required change would be pluralizing the subject of Part I of the test Justice Harlan suggested. 
Consequently, parties to a conversation, with no explicit or implied disclaimers applied to its 
contents, would each only have to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in their 
conversation.110 Katz is the foundation for conversational privacy, and only a slight modification 
would substantially modernize even that decades-old case. 
 
As complex as the judiciary’s work will turn out to be in the wake of decisions like Olson and 
Carter, it will become far more difficult as more remote communication cases reach the docket. 
Because the Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of multiple factors in evaluating standing and 
shared privacy interests, every arrival or improvement of communication technology could 
present a new set of factors for the courts to consider. Despite this Article’s contention that the 
conversations that are transmitted via remote communication technology are substantially the 
same, courts still treat the methods differently and use a hodgepodge of who, what, when, where, 
why, and how in their decisions that is wholly unnecessary and cumbersome. If anything, the 
courts must send out clear signals of which conversations are private and which are not for the 
benefit of society at large, not only for the government. Most importantly, society should be able 
to feel comfortable in judicial acknowledgment of its own long-settled privacy interests. 
 
Besides codifying the shared expectation of privacy in a conversation, the judiciary must set out 
clear and uniformly applicable standards for how far the privacy protection will extend. The 
inquiry would focus on whom parties to a conversation usually expect to be privy to the 
 
sufficiently establishes [a shared legitimate expectation of privacy]”). Though these two cases might appear to 
conflict, the Supreme Court has not actually struck down Broadhurst.
109 One illustration of this difficulty appears in United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 1996), 
which held that there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit a limited one, in [e-mail messages] sent and/or 
received on [America Online].” Id. at 417. Despite analogizing an e-mail to a sealed postal letter, the Court appeared 
to find an even lower expectation of privacy according to the number of people who might conceivably see the 
communication, even if unauthorized to access it. Thus, the expectation of privacy in an e-mail sent over a network 
would be lower than that sent in real time without an intermediate storage server. Since a central server stores all 
AOL e-mails, an AOL employee could conceivably access the server and read e-mails without the permission of the 
sender or the intended recipient. See id. at 418. Moreover, as in King, privacy in the e-mail terminates upon delivery, 
apparently without regard to who is reading the e-mail at that point. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 
2001), citing King, 55 F.3d at 1196. But see United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Rawlings 
did not establish any general rule that an individual forfeits his reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings 
simply by entrusting them to the care of another”). 
110 The example given above provides a good point of reference. Someone talking loudly within earshot of strangers 
arguably does not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy, whereas someone speaking in a private room, or 
through an e-mail or sealed letter, does. 
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conversation. Those who are invited into a conversation of any kind, whether a circle of friends 
at a cocktail party, participants in a conference call, or recipients of e-mail exchanges, are those 
who generally have full access to the contents of the conversation. The access comes by virtue of 
anyone already participating in the conversation inviting someone else’s participation. Thus, the 
most sensible approach for the judiciary to use in determining conversational standing limits is to 
presume standing based on invited participation in the conversation.111 Anyone invited to join 
any sort of conversation, including government agents, would have full access to any subsequent 
part of the conversation. An aggrieved party would have standing to challenge admission of any 
part of the conversation as evidence against him at trial, unless government agents were invited. 
On the other hand, those who eavesdropped on the conversation accidentally or deliberately 
would not qualify as invited participants in the conversation. Consequently, they would not have 
standing if they chose to participate without invitation. Finally, anyone who deliberately intruded 
on a conversation, acting on behalf of the government,112 could not use any of the conversation’s 
contents as criminal evidence against the participants. 
 
In redefining its inquiry into the expectation of privacy, courts would streamline their own task 
by using fewer factors in their determinations. Although it is somewhat circular to say that the 
courts would only have to decide whether or not a conversation was private, the approach is 
reasonable because it calls for the recognition of common societal attitudes about conversational 
privacy. Again, the medium of communication is irrelevant.113 That many of the new remote 
communication technologies have been available for a relatively short time does not indicate a 
substantial difference from long-existing communication methods.114 Treating telephone calls, 
cell phone text messages, e-mails, etc. as the same, and treating the interaction that takes place 
through such media as a conversation in which there is a shared privacy interest, has at least two 
benefits for the judiciary. First, it would make the two-part test from Katz much more simple and 
straightforward. Second, and most importantly, the test would apply to any new type of 
communication technology that developed, while the evaluation scheme would stay the same. In 
sum, the proposed new approach to conversations would take a well-established test and societal 
 
111 The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed this very principle in United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.  
2006), which held that the driver of a rental car lacked standing to challenge a government search of the vehicle 
because he was neither an authorized driver under the rental agreement nor had the authorized renter’s permission to 
drive the car. Id. at 1199. Analogizing the rental car to a conversation, Thomas would then suggest that only those 
with permission to join the conversation — that is, with an invitation to join the conversation by any original or 
invited participant — would have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge government intrusion.  
112 For example, private citizens who hacked into e-mail accounts, discovered incriminating information, and then 
turned the information over to the government. 
113 Similarly, the method of intrusion is irrelevant to whether or not the judiciary should recognize certain 
government actions as an invasion of privacy. See Simmons, supra note 42, at 1326-27 (noting that Fourth 
Amendment protections deteriorate when courts examine the means of intrusion, and that this erosion will continue 
as technological advances create investigation methods that are less intrusive against their targets but obtain the 
same results). 
114 Justice Brandeis suggested as much in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, noting that “[t]here is, in essence, 
no difference between the sealed letter and the private telephone message.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
475 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
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expectations from the past115 and make them universally applicable in both the present and in the 
future.116 
Even without arguments for judicial efficiency and recognition of society’s expectations, there is 
another strong sense in which to view conversational privacy as a constitutional entitlement. 
Those who contend that the “papers and effects” language of the Fourth Amendment cannot 
extend to remote communications other than postal letters, since no modern-day communication 
technology existed in the late 18th Century, must still acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment 
precludes unreasonable government searches and seizures of any kind. Katz reiterated this 
principle in dictum almost 200 years later: “The Constitution protects people, not places.” 
Without protection of conversations as papers and effects, the personal component of the Fourth 
Amendment still calls for stronger recognition of the intangible.117 Much of a person’s identity is 
intangible. One’s personality, one’s memories, thoughts, fears, and hopes expressed in words, 
and even one’s unexpressed secrets, are just as fundamental to identity today as they have always 
been. A modern-day example of this recognized right to personal privacy appears in 
Congressional telecommunications legislation. Its purpose exceeds protection of property 
interests, such as ownership of a phone line, use of a computer, or rental of an apartment. Rather, 
it affirms that a conversation, as a type of connection between persons, is something that people 
can expect to remain confidential from impulsive governmental intrusion. Conversational 
privacy might thus be implicit in the “persons” language of the Fourth Amendment. The terms of 
the Fourth Amendment are all tangible, but the scope of their protective scheme undoubtedly 
extends to equally important intangibles that make up a person’s life. Recognizing a right to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation, and an expectation that all invited 
participants maintain, is fundamentally recognizing security in one’s person.118 Thus, even if the 
judiciary will not seize upon the policy arguments in favor of conversational standing, it can look 
to formalist grounds and find equally compelling justification for a new approach in the text of 
the Fourth Amendment itself. 
 
B. Limits and Implications 
 
Even if the recognition of shared privacy interests in a conversation becomes well-established in 
the jurisprudence, its judicial manageability requires clear limits on its extent. The argument, 
restated, is that all intended participants in a conversation have standing to challenge 
constitutional violations of privacy rights in that conversation. In other words, only those invited 
into the conversation by any of those already participating would have recognized shared privacy 
 
115 But see Simmons, supra note 42, at 1332 (arguing that it is both impractical and unnecessary to consider 18th 
century societal expectations). 
116 See id. (“[A] workable test must be flexible enough to change as society changes, but rigid enough to stay 
constant even as technology changes”). 
117 The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment protects both tangible and intangible 
evidence from unreasonable search and seizure. See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 305 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485-86). 
118 Moreover, technological change does not defeat this fundamental principle. See Simmons, supra note 42, at 1335 
(contending that “[c]ourts must resist the temptation to conclude that just because a certain technology is available 
and the public could use it to render once-private realms public, that in fact it has been used to render them public” 
and without Fourth Amendment protection). 
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interests in the conversation.119 Provided that any invited participant made a reasonable attempt 
to keep the conversation private,120 her protected privacy interest would be equal to that of any 
other invited participant. 
 
On the other hand, if any party chose to invite the government’s participation, or to reveal 
information to the government that any participant disclosed in the conversation, then the 
aggrieved parties would have no standing to challenge any incriminating evidence thus 
exposed.121 This principle reflects both current jurisprudence and the balancing of interests 
inherent in criminal investigations. While private parties have an interest in the government 
respecting their civil liberties, the government has a countervailing interest in solving and 
preventing crime.122 The rule placing the government on equal footing with other invited 
participants would both preserve private citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights and settled 
expectations of privacy and encourage their assistance in fighting crime. Consequently, the 
Fourth Amendment would protect invited participants in a conversation only from clandestine 
and unauthorized governmental intrusion. The change in current jurisprudence would be no more 
than subtle, as any information voluntarily disclosed to the government would remain fair game 
for a criminal investigation. 
 
In practice, conversational standing would allow private citizens to ensure the privacy of 
conversations under their own control, including taking reasonable steps to shield the 
conversation from unauthorized participants. However, they would have no protection against 
any other participant volunteering information or inviting the government. Any criminal 
disclosures they made in the course of a conversation would enjoy more protection than in the 
current regime,123 but only slightly more. Thus, a defendant who unknowingly conversed with a 
police informant or undercover agent,124 or with a close confidante who then led police to 
incriminating evidence revealed in the conversation,125 would not have standing to contest 
evidence from the conversation.126 
The same would apply to messages either intended for, or easily accessible to, the public at large. 
A participant who posted a message on an electronic bulletin board would not have standing to 
 
119 The recognized shared privacy interest would only be the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Any 
failure to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy, such as talking on a cell phone in a crowded space and 
being overheard by an agent of the government, would defeat that particular party’s privacy interest but not that of 
any other invited participant. 
120 Such action would satisfy step one of the test from Katz.
121 See Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293; White, 401 U.S. 745. 
122 See Adler, supra note 2, at 1118-19 (arguing that the Katz standard should be reevaluated and applied, in the 
context of cyberspace, in order to balance competing governmental and societal interests). 
123 See Reetz, Note, supra note 11, at 200-01 (arguing that disclosure of information does not always amount to 
abandoning a privacy interest in that information). 
124 See Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293. 
125 See King, 55 F.3d 1193. 
126 This is not to say that standing to contest all evidence from the conversation would vanish. Assuming that the 
entire conversation were recorded, defendants could not challenge any evidence turned over directly to the 
government, as in words and phrases an informant reported. However, the government would then have to go 
through the usual procedures for complying with the Fourth Amendment, such as obtaining a warrant or establishing 
exigent circumstances, in order to access any other elements of the conversation. The government’s invited 
participation in a conversation would give access to the entire conversation. 
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suppress evidence obtained from any such message. Even if the message were intended only for 
certain people or groups, easy access to the bulletin board would publicize the message and 
effectively make anyone who saw it an invited participant. Extending the hypothetical, a 
participant who posted a flyer on a streetlight pole would also lack standing to challenge 
incriminating evidence based on the flyer. Even if the posting were in a remote area, it would 
still be held out for any passers-by, a group over which the posting party would have little or no 
control.127 Public exposure implies intent to publicize. Any passer-by would qualify as an invited 
participant, just as in the electronic bulletin board example. In sum, neither of the parties in the 
hypothetical would have standing to contest incriminating evidence arising from their postings 
because (a) the postings could presumably have been directed at anyone and/or (b) because the 
parties could have taken reasonable steps to exclude others from the conversation. Either 
example is akin to making an announcement using a megaphone in a public park: anyone passing 
by would have access to the contents of the message, including the police. 
 
In terms of explicit invitation to the government, parties to the conversation would have no 
protected right to control invitees. Social custom and manners might dictate that all participants 
gain each other’s approval, either express or implied, before inviting other participants. 
However, the Constitution is silent on habits and manners, only establishing the boundaries that 
govern the creation and enforcement of the laws. As an example, say good friends X and Y are 
having a conversation. Y invites his good friend Z to join the conversation, but without X’s 
knowledge or consent. Z turns out to be a government agent. In practice, this scenario might take 
the form of X and Y having an e-mail conversation and Y deciding to blindly copy Z on e-mails 
to X.128 Even if X reveals incriminating evidence to Y and asks Y not to tell anyone, the 
information is part of the conversation, and Z is an equal participant. Despite Y not being such a 
good friend after all, X has no standing to challenge the admission of that evidence against him if 
Z decides to use it.129 Such a scheme promotes the balancing of civil liberties and criminal 
investigation by encouraging Y to implicate X, yet deterring Z from unauthorized intrusion. 
 
Two critical issues come to mind in defining the limits of conversational standing as discussed 
here. The first involves the government trying to invite itself into the conversation. For instance, 
if a government agent makes a comment intended to be part of a conversation, and one 
participant responds to the comment in a way that suggests invitation, and no other party objects, 
then the government would be entering a conversation without an initial invitation. This practice 
would be tantamount to eavesdropping if the government sought invitation solely to access the 
conversation without a warrant. If the practice were sanctioned, then the government could try to 
invite itself into a number of conversations it believed could lead to incriminating information, 
regardless of the likelihood of such evidence actually surfacing. Its conduct would resemble 
indiscriminate profiling based on superficial characteristics, already viewed with disfavor. 
Moreover, defendants could assert an entrapment defense against the government, despite any 
rules on conversational standing. In such a situation, settled entrapment doctrine would most 
 
127 Of course, this situation can only apply to areas that are open to the public. Gated communities, or other fortified 
zones, would present a more complicated question of public openness, which might be enough to create standing if 
taken as a reasonable limitation on participants. 
128 Or, for an example that could have taken place before e-mail was common, suppose X and Y are talking on the 
phone and Y asks Z to pick up another receiver on the same phone line but in a different room. 
129 Nevertheless, if Z eavesdropped on the conversation without the knowledge or consent of either X or Y, then X 
would have standing to suppress incriminating remarks in spite of the close friendship between Y and Z. 
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likely apply — that is, the government would have to prove the defendant’s predisposition 
towards committing the crime.130 Since the government might try to circumvent conversational 
standing rules, including those that already exist, entrapment defenses based on what we might 
call baited-invitation techniques would effectively curb possible government abuse. 
 
Second, and most importantly, the limits of conversational standing depend on the limits of a 
conversation itself. While these limits are harder to define, we might construe them as the 
traditional beginnings and endings of a conversation so that they would apply to all remote 
communications. The beginning of a conversation occurs when the original parties exchange a 
verbal or written greeting, or some gesture that implies greeting. The end is more complex and is 
the component that the government might easily attack without clear definition. Generally, one’s 
participation in a conversation ends upon some indication that he or she no longer intends to take 
part. She can signal the indication by saying goodbye, hanging up the phone, or saying 
something indicating, from her perspective, that the purpose of the conversation has been 
fulfilled or that the business to be performed through the conversation is complete. Once any 
invited participant leaves the conversation, then she is no longer a party and must either initiate a 
new conversation or be invited again in order to regain access.131 The greatest complication 
arises in the “ongoing conversation” context. The judiciary would do best to construe ongoing 
conversations narrowly. For instance, once parties have hung up the phone, the conversation is 
over, even if they intend to talk again. Once the business of an e-mail exchange is settled, that 
conversation has also ended. In the context of a dispute, determining the end of an ongoing 
conversation would be heavily fact-based if it were based on remote, recorded transmissions 
such as e-mail exchanges. Conversations without any clear, confined purpose would be 
considered ongoing, and thus any of their contents would be admissible into evidence, at least 
following the invitation to the government to join. As with any form of direct correspondence, 
when such a situation finally reaches the courts, the starting point should be well-established 
societal expectations, rather than the complex inquiries now used to evaluate conversational 
privacy. 
 
III. Modern-day interpretations of shared privacy interests 
While conversational standing has yet to gain explicit judicial recognition, it is useful to consider 
its application to a variety of current contexts, including both cases and other disputes that might 
reach the judiciary at some point. This section first considers how conversational standing might 
apply to the recently decided Supreme Court case of Georgia v. Randolph.132 It then proposes a 
framework for reconciling conversational standing with the National Security Administration’s 
monitoring of phone calls and e-mail exchanges between the United States and other countries. 
 
A. Georgia v. Randolph 
Randolph is the most recent Supreme Court case to address shared privacy interests, although on 
a more tangible level because it involved privacy interests in the home. Fourth Amendment 
 
130 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992) (holding that the “entrapment” defense is valid when the 
government cannot prove defendant’s criminal predisposition). 
131 That is, for purposes of constitutional protection. 
132 126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006). 
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jurisprudence has traditionally given the home more stringent protection than any other sphere of 
life, and Randolph generally followed the same line of justification. In Randolph, the police 
responded to a woman’s call about a domestic dispute with her husband that culminated in his 
taking their child away with him.133 The police did not have a warrant, but they attempted to 
access the house by asking for the wife’s permission to search the bedroom, suspecting that the 
husband was keeping illegal drugs inside the house.134 The wife consented to the search, but the 
husband, Randolph, who had recently returned and was standing nearby, immediately 
objected.135 The police searched the home anyway. When they searched the bedroom, the police 
found a straw that Randolph had allegedly used to snort cocaine.136 Randolph was tried and 
convicted on the basis of this and other evidence. He challenged the admission of the evidence 
on Fourth Amendment grounds. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue to be 
decided was whether one party’s consent to a police search of an area or item could override the 
objection of another party with a shared privacy or property interest in the area or item, provided 
the other party was present to make the objection at the time of the consent. 
 
Justice Souter’s majority opinion held that the husband’s objection defeated the wife’s consent, 
rendering the police search and seizure unconstitutional and the challenged evidence 
inadmissible.137 The majority had to distinguish United States v. Matlock138 in justifying its 
holding. In that case, the defendant was not present to oppose a co-tenant’s consent to a police 
search, locked in a squad car parked outside the house at the time the consent was given.139 Thus, 
the holding depended on Randolph’s presence at the time of the consent. Had he been elsewhere 
or given the objection at a different time, his wife’s consent would have been valid under 
Matlock and the search and seizure would have been constitutional. Most importantly, however, 
Justice Souter supported the “presence” technicality by appealing to “social custom,” which 
seemed to form the backbone of the entire majority opinion.140 He mentioned that a guest invited 
to a house party by one person would generally not feel free to enter if a co-occupant objected 
upon her arrival.141 In fact, according to Justice Souter, any time a guest thought of entering a 
home with the consent and objection of two parties with shared privacy interests in the home, the 
objecting party’s wishes would usually carry the day.142 The majority’s care to note the shared 
privacy interest in the home might open the door for other explorations of shared privacy 
interests, but social custom was the deciding factor in holding the search and seizure 
unconstitutional. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, highlighted problems with the majority’s shared privacy 
analysis, particularly in the context of the home. The Chief Justice pointed out the ambiguity and 
arbitrary application of the majority’s rule, emphasizing the dangers that could easily result. For 
instance, he persuasively mentioned that by the majority’s rule, the husband’s objection would 
 




137 Id. at 1528. 
138 415 U.S. 164 (1973). 
139 Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
140 See 126 S.Ct. at 1526. 
141 Id. at 1522-23. 
142 Id. at 1523 (“Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions”) 
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have been invalid had he been sleeping in the next room,143 allowing the wife to easily defeat any 
shared privacy interest he might have. Moreover, the Chief Justice addressed a concern that 
Justice Breyer had also raised during the proceedings, namely the possibility of domestic 
violence: in a similar situation, the husband could object as the wife consented, forcing the police 
to leave, after which the husband could immediately attack his wife.144 In sum, the dissent 
exposed the instability of the rule the majority announced. 
 
The application of Randolph shared privacy to conversational standing is difficult to reconcile, 
particularly because of the same-time requirement and the time frames of different 
conversations. Read broadly, Randolph holds that where shared privacy interests are implicated, 
objection trumps consent only if the two are simultaneous. If a party to a conversation were to 
cite Randolph in criminal proceedings, arguing that its principle applied to conversations in 
which one party invited government participation over another’s objection, then at least two 
complications could appear. First, simultaneous consent and objection would be practically 
impossible, especially in remote communications not conducted in real time. For example, if a 
participant in an e-mail conversation offered to turn over recorded e-mails to the government 
over another’s near-immediate objection, Randolph’s applicability would be difficult to 
determine.145 The e-mail conversation might be nearly in real-time, but the objection would still 
not be contemporaneous, as it was in Randolph, or even as it would be if it were taking place on 
the phone. All would depend on the legal definition of simultaneity and its application to the 
factual timing. Moreover, the judiciary would have to make a controversial determination of how 
close in time a valid objection would be.  
 
Second, even if the judiciary considered the objection contemporaneous, it would still have to 
contend with the presence rationale that was also critical in Randolph. The defendant was 
physically present to object to his wife’s consent. Physical presence is necessarily impossible in 
remote communications. Taken literally, this complication would mean that no objection could 
ever defeat consent to join a remote conversation under Randolph. The only way a defendant 
could plausibly satisfy the presence requirement would be if the judiciary construed presence to 
mean invited participation in the conversation. Ultimately, the presence issue would turn on 
whether the judiciary wanted Randolph to apply to conversations or instead found Matlock more 
apposite, since presence is a necessary condition for satisfying the Randolph test. Randolph’s 
applicability to conversations is bound to be complex, perhaps even easier to manipulate than the 
majority’s rule in Randolph itself. 
 
As difficult as it is to square the shared privacy interests in Randolph with those in a remote 
conversation, the case appears somewhat inconsistent with conversational standing, which 
depends on invited participation. One of the requisite conditions for conversational standing as 
described thus far is that parties have no effective control over invitees. However, Randolph 
143 Id. at 1535 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 1537-38. 
145 The same would be true of conversations conducted by instant messaging and text messaging. However, even if 
Randolph did apply, the principle of Hoffa and White might control the outcome: parties are free to reveal any 
incriminating information to the government, even over the objection of those implicated. The clash between that 
principle and the holding in Randolph involves the reasonable expectation of privacy, which existed in Randolph but 
not in Hoffa and White.
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suggests that when one party invites the government at the same time as another’s objection,146 
that objection is valid. Even if the objection were given at the same time and place in 
conversation, as defined by the judiciary, any other party’s consent would act as an invitation, 
which the objecting party could only defeat with another simultaneous objection. At that point, 
an objecting party’s only recourse would be to drop out of the conversation.147 Regardless of the 
objecting party’s actions, the consenting party could manipulate the situation to invite 
government participation even more easily than in Randolph. In order to square the Randolph 
holding with the concept of conversational standing, same-time objection and consent would 
become the only instance in which a party could exclude an invitee from a conversation against 
another party’s wishes. As pointed out, however, another party’s consent at another time would 
still defeat the objection.148 
Randolph’s other distinguishing characteristic as applied to conversations is its setting. While the 
case focused on social custom, and in fact grounded its reasoning in what the majority 
considered common practice, it focused as much or even more on the location of the government 
intrusion: the home. The opinion eagerly mentioned the familiar house-as-castle metaphor. If 
future courts emphasize the shared privacy interest in the home, rather than the shared privacy 
interest in any particular area or item, then the justification for shared conversational privacy as a 
whole will be even weaker. Moreover, even reading Randolph to apply to any shared privacy 
interest, the specific interests addressed in the case – namely the interest in the home and the 
interest in effects within the home – would still be separable. The home was searched and effects 
were seized, despite the shared privacy interests. Thus, Randolph might apply strictly to shared 
privacy interests in, and within, the home. In fact, the Court in Randolph was probably more 
interested in affirming protection for the home than in privacy protection for the cocaine-laced 
straw. If it is the home that truly matters in evaluating shared privacy of the kind set out in 
Randolph, then litigants will struggle to apply it to conversations, which take place in almost 
every walk of life. 
 
This is not to say that Randolph’s application beyond the home is entirely implausible. Just as 
there are different areas in which privacy interests are shared, certain conversations follow a 
similar track. Like the protection for the home, conversations between people in their capacities 
as members of certain categories,149 such as doctors and patients, attorneys and clients, or clerics 
and penitents, generally receive much greater privacy protection than other kinds of 
conversations. The judiciary could decide to apply Randolph to any of these conversations if it 
found the degree of privacy protection for the home akin to the kind of protection given to 
certain privileged conversations.150 Such an approach would even trump conversational standing, 
 
146 Again, the “same time” need definition for conversational purposes. 
147 The entire situation might be inconsequential, since the consenting party could always turn over evidence of the 
objecting party and could always “rat out” the objecting party after she decided not to participate. 
148 The court in Randolph left the question of consent at a later time unresolved. However, it strongly suggested that 
such consent would defeat the earlier objection, since the validity of the objection depended on both timing and 
presence. If Randolph’s wife had given consent when Randolph was not at home, even after the encounter described 
in the case, the Court would probably consider any subsequent police search reasonable. 
149 If the persons in question are speaking outside of their protected capacities, then their privacy interests probably 
become less defensible. 
150 Put differently, objection to the government intruding or participating in any of these enumerated conversations 
should trump consent, but if the conversation does not fall within the set of defined privileged interactions, then the 
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since it could allow one party, after confiding incriminating information to a particular authority 
figure, to prevent the authority figure from revealing that information to the government.151 
Though preserving special privileges in conversations might be good policy, the judiciary would 
still have to be nuanced in its application of Randolph. For instance, the same-time and presence 
requirements would presumably still have to govern the inquiry in order for Randolph to map 
cleanly onto privileged conversations. Doing so, however, might call for the jumbled approach 
described above. In placing Randolph and shared conversational privacy side by side, their 
conflict depends on specific interpretations of Randolph itself. Though they might not stand on 
common ground, they might also peacefully coexist. 
 
On a basic level, one standard could reconcile conversational privacy with a special version of 
Randolph applying outside the home but only to expressly privileged conversations. Although it 
would cut back slightly on the core concept of conversational standing, it might still give the 
judiciary a plausible and manageable policy. In sum, parties to a private conversation, regardless 
of the transmission medium, would be free to share their privacy interests in the conversation 
with whomever they chose, even over the objection of co-participants, unless the conversation 
were privileged. Randolph would then be available to defendants in privileged conversations 
even if conversational standing were not available, and the time and place requirements could be 
relaxed somewhat.152 Even though critics might argue against this approach as giving defendants 
another way to use the exclusionary rule, Randolph would still have very narrow application, 
only applying to certain conversations in certain contexts.153 Further, conversational standing 
itself, though an additional tool for defendants who otherwise would have fewer and less 
vigorously protected privacy interests, still invites the balancing of governmental and private 
citizen interests. The next section describes one such balancing approach in a particularly critical 
situation. 
 
B. NSA Warrantless Eavesdropping 
 
In December of 2005, the New York Times revealed that the Bush Administration had 
authorized government eavesdropping on communications between the United States and 
 
consenter has the last word. For example, suppose the government joins an e-mail interaction without invitation and 
asks if it can see information a patient revealed in e-mails sent to a doctor. The doctor says she’ll send the e-mails, 
but the patient objects upon finding out what the doctor intends to do. The patient’s objection would bar the 
governments from using any evidence contained in the e-mails against him. For a contrary example, suppose two 
friends hatch a criminal conspiracy via unprivileged cell-phone instant messaging. The government asks one friend, 
via another instant message, to explain the conspiracy and implicate his co-conspirators. The friend is happy to 
comply, but the one who stands to be implicated objects. The objection against government intrusion is invalid. 
151 First, conversational standing would allow any party to invite the government’s participation regardless of status, 
so sustaining one party’s objection would have to be an exception. Second, the enforcement of conversational 
standing’s invited participant concession in privileged conversations would be poor public policy. It would defeat 
the entire purpose of privileging certain conversations by making their confidentiality toothless: the trusted parties 
could readily turn over information to the government or allow the government to eavesdrop, and the confiding 
parties would not have standing to challenge the evidence thus obtained. 
152 Ironically, the parties who would want to use Randolph to protect their conversational privacy would be the same 
parties who would want to assert standing to exclude evidence from the conversation! 
153 For instance, a conversation between a doctor and a patient in that doctor’s office relating to business between 
them would be protected. A conversation between the same two people but not in their capacities as doctor and 
patient, or entirely outside the scope of their doctor-patient relationship, would not be protected. 
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abroad,154 hoping that the eavesdropping would help government agents to thwart planned 
terrorist attacks. The eavesdropping had been taking place without judicial approval, and the 
Administration had authorized it dozens of times since the terrorist attacks of September 2001.155 
The surveillance extended not only to telephone conversations, but also to Internet 
correspondence.156 Public outcry over the warrantless eavesdropping was almost immediate. 
Critics pointed to its use as a violation of the Federal Wiretap Statute,157 which requires an 
authorizing warrant or federal court order for each instance of wiretapping.158 Beyond the statute, 
however, some said that eavesdropping on telephone calls was patently unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.159 The Administration vigorously defended the legality of 
its strategy,160 but the controversy did not disappear. The dispute highlights both the difficulty 
and the importance of balancing the government’s interest in protecting its citizens from terrorist 
attacks, sometimes through questionable means, against the civil interest in protecting 
conversational privacy. 
 
The concept of conversational standing could provide a healthy balancing approach to the NSA’s 
technique. If applied, it would not require any exceptions to its present form, instead only 
limiting actions the government could take against suspected terrorists after the fact.161 In such a 
regime, the government could continue its warrantless eavesdropping on domestic-international 
phone calls, allowing it to gain access to sensitive and otherwise unobtainable information it 
needed to thwart terrorist attacks. Even though citizens might want to maintain their privacy for 
modesty concerns — that is, even if the information obtained by the government is innocuous, 
people might rather have the information remain private for personal, emotional reasons that are 
difficult to explain — the critical factor in warrantless eavesdropping would be protection from 
prosecution for private information that the eavesdropping uncovered. Thus, despite the 
government’s use of information gained from warrantless eavesdropping, the parties to the 
conversation would have standing to exclude any evidence obtained pursuant to the 
conversation. Their rights would be the equivalent of transactional immunity in a criminal 
prosecution: the government would not be able to punish them based on anything revealed in the 
conversation or any evidence that the government would not have discovered “but for” the 
eavesdropping. Of course, the government would still have all the usual tools available to defeat 
 
154 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,” N.Y. TIMES Dec. 16, 2005, at 
A1. Some eavesdropping also took place on purely domestic calls, although those incidents were apparently 
unintentional. See Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Defends Spy Program and Denies Misleading Public,” N.Y. TIMES Jan. 2, 
2006, at A11. 
155 See David E. Sanger, “In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying,” N.Y. TIMES Dec. 18, 2005, at 1. 
156 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Domestic Surveillance: The Program; Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, 
Officials Report,” N.Y. TIMES Dec. 24, 2005, at A1. 
157 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006). 
158 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006). 
159 Commentators had been attacking the constitutionality of other surveillance methods well before 
the New York Times exposed the NSA’s eavesdropping. See, e.g., Lee, The USA Patriot Act and 
Telecommunications: Privacy Under Attack, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER TECH. L.J. 371, 400 (2003) 
(arguing that the telecommunications provisions of the Patriot Act violate the Fourth Amendment and 
that “[t]he Act effectively snubs the judicial system in favor of executive power”). 
160 See Sanger, supra note 155. 
161 In Justice Robert Jackson’s view, “if we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. .. it seems to 
me they should depend somewhat on the gravity of the offense.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting in part). 
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the parties’ standing, such as independent source and inevitable discovery. The government 
could punish the offending parties in other ways, such as using the press to sully their reputations 
and deporting them if they were foreign nationals illegally in the United States. Only one 
exception would uphold the constitutionality of eavesdropping without warrants by effectively 
protecting parties against unreasonable search and seizure:162 evidence obtained without warrants 
and solely from conversations would be formally inadmissible at trial. 
 
Standing to contest warrantless eavesdropping on conversations would represent good, judicially 
justifiable public policy for at least three reasons. First, it would avert the controversy that less 
stringent warrant requirements would generate. Although such a technique would place the 
eavesdropping clearly within the law by complying with the Federal Wiretap Statute and the 
plain language of the Fourth Amendment, it would also raise questions of whether obtaining 
such warrants were too easy, and thus whether the warrants were properly issued at all. Second, 
the policy would carve out a judicially manageable standard that would still be relatively 
straightforward to implement despite its vulnerability to attack on nuances and technicalities. 
Simply put, eavesdropping would be permissible, and the government could use information 
obtained from eavesdropping to fight terrorism, but the evidence would automatically be 
inadmissible at trial. Finally, it acknowledges that while citizens have an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in telephone calls made to private parties, certain government interests are 
so important that not even the strict language of the Constitution should bar their fulfillment. 
Despite formal problems of constitutionalism and the limits the Constitution places on the 
government, exceptional circumstances reasonably require some constitutional protections to be 
relaxed, at least temporarily.163 The application of conversational standing, and the compromise 
it creates in order to fit constitutional boundaries as closely as possible, could be the most 
workable and palatable solution for both the government and private citizens. 
 
Beyond the policy rationale for using the balancing test, it is clear that avoiding such a test could 
lead to drastic results. The consequences of not balancing civil liberties and governmental 
interests, particularly in an area as sensitive as terrorism, provide ample justification on their 
own. For example, at one extreme, the government could wiretap domestic-international phone 
calls at will, justifying each wiretap as a critical security measure. While such an action would 
completely satisfy government interests in obtaining information through remote 
communication, it would suffer from two pitfalls. First, the approach would eventually prove 
ineffective or even counterproductive, since anyone who truly wanted to shield information from 
the government would find alternative means of transmission. Second, the approach would have 
a chilling effect on conversations between parties within and outside the United States. Innocent 
parties with no terrorist intentions might limit their expression, fearing the government’s use of 
other information against them for some other reason.164 Government freedom to listen to private 
conversations at will represents the same Orwellian state that the Federal Wiretap Statute, and 
even the Constitution itself, were designed to prevent. 
 
162 The protection is slightly different in that it takes place ex post as transactional immunity from prosecution, 
whereas the Fourth Amendment itself seeks to protect citizens from government abuse ex ante.
163 For instance, the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment, when the government need not go 
through constitutional procedures before obtaining evidence that is likely to be destroyed or capturing fleeing felons. 
164 It is questionable whether the government could even use information obtained from the intercepted phone calls 
unrelated to its primary purpose in eavesdropping: obtaining information to use in preventing terrorist attacks. 
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The opposite extreme is equally disturbing. If the judiciary enforced an absolute prohibition on 
wiretapping without warrants, then the government would struggle to legally obtain needed 
information. For instance, upon heightened suspicion short of probable cause, but without the 
ability to obtain a warrant, the government might be handcuffed in thwarting a likely terrorist 
attack. Imposing more aggressive procedural restraints would allow at least some terrorism 
planning information to escape government surveillance. The most obvious consequence of this 
extreme is also the most severe: attacks might occur that the government could have otherwise 
prevented. In fact, if the government were sure enough of its target but still could not obtain a 
warrant to investigate, it might choose to take preventive measures that would violate the 
Constitution.165 With restrictions thus placed on the government, however, civil liberties would 
enjoy excessive protection, effectively impeding the government from doing its work under the 
most pressing of circumstances. While the situation described is a worst-case scenario, it remains 
a possibility. 
 
Fortunately, the combination of conversational standing and transactional immunity strikes a 
healthy medium between the two extremes just described. Neither party has its interests fully 
satisfied, but the two sets of interests are not mutually exclusive. Generally speaking, the 
government seeks to protect its citizens from grave harm, while citizens seek to protect their 
privacy from capricious governmental intrusion. By establishing a system of carefully 
enumerated powers, along with checks and balances, the Constitution itself is geared toward a 
healthy relationship between citizens and government.166 The proposed combination seeks a 
similar goal, and in a particularly pressing issue of modern times, it would do as much work as 
any other provision in ensuring the achievement of that goal. 
 
Of course, the balance between conversational standing and transactional immunity must be 
constitutional to be plausible in the first place. Although warrantless wiretapping might appear to 
violate the plain language of the Federal Wiretap Statute and the Constitution itself, a number of 
reasons point to the proposed scheme’s constitutionality. 
 
First, transactional immunity for contents of conversations obtained without warrants would 
serve as a prophylactic measure against admitted violations of the Fourth Amendment. In theory, 
the only unconstitutional consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation is using the evidence in 
a prosecution of anyone whose constitutional rights were infringed. The exclusionary rule is the 
direct remedy for the violation, effectively placing the defendants – the conversants in this case – 
in the same position they would have been in had the government never violated their 
constitutional rights. At the same time, the government obtains the information it needs to 
 
165 Although the choice might not be universal, most would likely prefer an egregious constitutional violation to a 
devastating terrorist attack. 
166 More specifically, the Constitution applies to the relationship between citizens of the United States and the 
government of the United States. The Supreme Court has held, for instance, that the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to searches and seizures, on behalf of the United States, of foreigner-owned property on foreign soil. See 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990); see also id. at 265 (finding that “the people” in 
the language of the Fourth Amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who 
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community”). 
However, it has also assumed that Fourth Amendment protection can extend to undocumented foreign nationals 
living in the United States. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
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prevent terrorist attacks, using the information solely for criminal prevention, not for criminal 
prosecution. 
 
The second argument for the scheme’s constitutionality is more dubious and involves the 
wiretapping regardless of transactional immunity. Supporters of wiretapping suspected terrorists 
without warrants can argue that government eavesdropping is reasonable in such situations and 
that exigent circumstances allow the government to proceed without having to follow the usual 
protocol. There are two problems with this argument that make the first argument, presented 
above in favor of the entire scheme,167 considerably more attractive. First, in passing the Federal 
Wiretap Statute to forbid unwarranted government eavesdropping, Congress has already strongly 
suggested that the eavesdropping is unreasonable.168 Assuming that Congress reflects the will of 
the people as a popularly-elected legislature,169 society then implicitly considers the warrantless 
wiretapping approach unreasonable. Second, a judicial determination that warrantless 
eavesdropping to prevent terrorist attacks were reasonable could amount to undesirable, content-
based judicial policymaking. Courts would have to define when the government’s interest in 
accessing a conversation were so substantial that the government should be allowed to proceed 
with what would otherwise be a constitutional violation. Aside from its interpretations being 
open to disagreement, whether the opposition originated in other government branches or in 
public opinion, the judiciary would have to create categories in which the government 
eavesdropping without a warrant would be presumptively reasonable. Such categories might 
include violent criminals, sex offenders, other felons who had been “clean” for many years, 
suspicious individuals deemed likely to immediately harm themselves or others, and many 
more.170 The judiciary would have to explain each of these in turn. It would inevitably become 
mired in the kind of decisions it typically tries to avoid. The judicial complications that would 
stem from rationalizing warrantless wiretaps could easily become not only highly controversial, 
but possibly even intractable. 
 
Even without the combination of conversational standing and transactional immunity, private 
citizens in the United States still have strong constitutional arguments against warrantless 
eavesdropping. In fact, even if the government does not recognize shared privacy interests in the 
conversations it is investigating, the constitutional privacy rights of at least the domestic party 
remain intact. They exist according to both the conversational standing approach and existing 
doctrine.171 Under conversational standing, the domestic party has the right to prevent 
warrantless government intrusion on her conversation, by virtue of conversations receiving 
special status in the set of Fourth Amendment protections. In terms of the status quo, and even 
focusing on tangible property, the domestic party still has the constitutional right to keep her 
telephone and telephone line free from warrantless government intrusion. If the government 
 
167 That is, defendants’ conversational standing and transactional immunity as a remedy for warrantless wiretapping. 
168 See Kerr, supra note 20, at 838 (“Additional privacy protections are needed to fill the gap between the 
protections that a reasonable person might want and what the Fourth Amendment actually provides[, and] those 
protections historically have come from Congress”). 
169 Although there is concern that even members of Congress are out of touch with the privacy interests of their 
constituencies. See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 1, at 1596-98 (calling for modifications to the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act to more accurately reflect present-day privacy concerns). 
170 The government could probably obtain warrants for such wiretaps without much difficulty. The example only 
serves to illustrate what could result if warrants were not required to investigate certain categories of people. 
171 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259. 
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eavesdrops on a domestic phone line without a warrant, then the owner of the line has standing to 
exclude at least his own contributions to the conversation thus intercepted, according to Katz and 
its progeny. Thus, the domestic party can challenge the government’s intrusion either way, 
whether or not conversational standing finds a place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Regardless of the government’s interpretation of warrantless wiretapping, domestic parties retain 
their own conversational privacy protection. 
 
C. The Conversation as Private Property 
The discussion of conversational standing thus far has focused on shared expectations of privacy 
in a conversation. However, there is also a justification for the concept based not on privacy, but 
on the original, critical component of Fourth Amendment standing: the property interest.172 The 
core of the property right in Anglo-American jurisprudence is the right to exclude others from 
using the property. In the context of conversations, the right to exclude is not absolute for all 
parties involved, particularly if shared privacy interests are recognized. One party’s desire to 
exclude does not always defeat another equally-situated party’s desire to include, as 
demonstrated in a comparison of Randolph and Matlock. Nevertheless, any party to a 
conversation has a generally recognized right to exclude those who try to participate without 
invitation. With the right to exclude being the core characteristic of a private conversation, such 
a conversation is then arguably like the property of the participants. If so, it could be subject to 
constitutional protections for private property, most notably those of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause. 
 
The Takings Clause provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”173 If a private conversation qualifies as private property, and if the 
government eavesdrops on the conversation and uses any information it contains, then the 
government has presumably performed a “taking” of the conversation. More specifically, the 
government’s use of the information, for purposes such as thwarting a terrorist attack or 
uncovering another criminal conspiracy, is public in that it is done on behalf of all those within 
the government’s jurisdiction — that is, the citizens who comprise the public. 
 
While the government is allowed to take private property for public use, it must provide just 
compensation to the property owners in order for its action to be constitutional. How to provide 
just compensation to those whose conversations the government has intercepted is a challenging 
issue. How much compensation is “just” follows as another necessarily difficult issue. 
Fortunately, there is a relatively simple solution to the just compensation problem, and not one 
that involves money. In terms of the warrantless wiretapping analysis described above, an 
exclusionary rule guaranteeing freedom from prosecution based on a conversation would 
represent just compensation. Such an approach would compensate conversants by only allowing 
the government to use their conversations to prevent crimes, not to punish or deter. Moreover, 
just as in the NSA wiretapping example, the government could obtain important information and 
 
172 See Kerr, supra note 20, at 823 (noting that in Katz, “[b]y entering the phone booth and paying for a call, Charles 
Katz bought a temporary right to exclude others from the phone booth that was protected by the Fourth 
Amendment”); id. at 827 (“noting that “both before and after Katz, Fourth Amendment protections have mostly 
matched the contours of real property law”) 
173 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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use it for public benefit while still deterring those thinking of committing similar crimes. Would-
be criminals, understanding that the government could use information from their conversations 
to defeat their illicit objectives, might find such a privacy reduction dissuasive. The same 
balancing approach grounded in shared privacy concerns is thus equally applicable to shared 
property interests. In sum, both private citizens and the government have a range of theoretical 
and jurisprudential tools at their disposal to advance their own interests. Balance is the hallmark 
of the United States government and political system, just as it is the hallmark of conversational 
standing in every context. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Certain conversations are private. Though recognized in varying degrees, the principle has been 
clear throughout the history of the United States Constitution. The judiciary has often recognized 
the privacy inherent in conversations. Nevertheless, shared privacy interests in conversations 
have been slower to gain recognition. Conversational privacy loses much of its force if it applies 
unevenly to participants in a conversation regardless of their subjective control. Participants in a 
conversation cannot always exclude others whom they do not wish to participate, much less 
prevent any other participants from sharing the contents of the conversation. But they all must be 
equally free from unchecked government intrusion if their privacy is to mean anything in modern 
criminal procedure. Moreover, their privacy must not depend on the medium in which they 
choose to communicate, since the purpose of remote conversation is the same regardless of the 
medium. With communication options constantly becoming more numerous and more advanced, 
it is particularly important to recognize shared conversational privacy interests at this juncture. 
Among other advantages, doing so will provide a judicially manageable standard applicable to 
any remote communication technology, past, present, and future, and it will square modern 
jurisprudence with society’s established expectations of conversational privacy. 
 
In terms of constitutional doctrine, shared privacy interests in a conversation fit best within the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. The right to suppress evidence obtained in violation of 
one’s Fourth Amendment rights — that is, standing to assert the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment and, if necessary, the exclusionary rule — is only available on one’s own behalf. In 
other words, a search or seizure is unreasonable only as to the direct target of the government 
action. Only the targeted stakeholder has standing. Other parties, regardless of their interest in 
the matter, do not. As the doctrine currently operates, only direct targets of a conversational 
interception, such as those whose phone lines are wiretapped, can suppress evidence contained in 
the conversation. However, if the judiciary formally recognizes shared privacy interests in 
conversations, then an unconstitutional search and/or seizure against one party would also apply 
to all other parties. This concept of conversational standing calls for all invited parties to a 
conversation, regardless of the communication medium, to maintain recognized constitutional 
privacy rights in the conversation. Hence, so long as each has taken subjective steps to limit the 
conversation’s participants, each has standing to claim Fourth Amendment protection. All other 
options remaining equal, namely the ability of any participant to involve the government without 
violating the constitution, the concept suggests only that shared privacy interests in a 
conversation receive constitutional status. 
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Far from being a dangerous principle, conversational standing instead allows the judiciary to 
affirm the widespread expectations of the people it serves. It requires that society continue to feel 
secure in its private conversations while addressing broader security concerns. It allows everyone 
to avoid getting lost in technicalities, as well as feeling unsure of which conversations are private 
and which are not based on minor details. Most importantly, it honors a human desire for privacy 
extending to some of the most intimate spheres of a person’s identity, many of which appear in 
conversations with specified people. The concept has remained hidden in the background of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for some time, and the shared privacy interests it connotes 
have gained at least mild recognition at the higher levels of the judiciary. The sooner its place 
becomes more solidified, the more streamlined criminal procedure will become in the remote 
communication arena. It is a healthy change, and its implementation will be good for both the 
conversationalists of today and the generations of tomorrow. 
